|
The Spanish schooner Amistad, on the 27th
day of June, 1839, cleared out from Havana, in Cuba, for Puerto
Principe, in the same island, having on board, Captain Ferrer, and Ruiz
and Montez, spanish subjects. Captain Ferrer had on board Antonio, a
slave; Ruiz had forty-nine negroes; Montez had four negroes, which were
claimed by them as slaves, and stated to be their property, in passports
or documents, signed by the Governor General of Cuba. In fact, these
African negroes had been, a very short time before they were put on
board the Amistad, brought into Cuba, by Spanish slave traders, in
direct contravention of the treaties between Spain and Great Britain,
and in violation of the laws of Spain. On the voyage of the Amistad, the
negroes rose, killed the captain, and took possession of the vessel.
They spared the lives of Ruiz and Montez, on condition that they would
aid in steering the Amistad for the coast of Africa, or to some place
where negro slavery was not permitted by the laws of the country. Ruiz
and Montez deceived the negroes, who were totally ignorant of
navigation, and steered the Amistad for the United States; and she
arrived off Long Island, in the state of New York, on the 26th of
August, and anchored within half a mile of the shore. Some of the
negroes went to shore to procure supplies of water and provisions, and
the vessel was then discovered by the United States brig Washington.
Lieutenant Gedney, commanding the Washington assisted by his officers
and crew, took possession of the Amistad, and of the negroes on shore
and in the vessel, brought them into the District of Connecticut, and
there libelled the vessel, the cargo, and the negroes for salvage.
Libels for salvage were also presented in the District Court of the
United States, for the District of Connecticut, by persons who had
aided, as they alleged, in capturing the negroes on shore on Long
Island, and contributed to the vessel, cargo, and negroes being taken
into possession by the brig Washington. Ruiz and Montez filed claims to
the negroes as their slaves, and prayed that they, and parts of the
cargo of the Amistad, might be delivered to them, or to the
representatives of the crown of Spain.The attorney of the District of
Connecticut filed an information stating that the Minister of Spain had
claimed of the government of the United States that the vessel, cargo,
and slaves should be restored, under the provisions of the treaty
between the United States and Spain, the same having arrived within the
limits and jurisdiction of the United States, under such circumstances
as made it the duty of the vessel of the United States, under such
circumstances as made it the duty of the United States to cause them to
be restored to the true owners thereof. The information asked that the
Court would make such order as would enable the United States to comply
with the treaty; or, if it should appear that the negroes had been
brought from Africa, in violation of the laws of the United States, that
the Court would make an order for the removal of the negroes to Africa,
according to the laws of the United States. A claim for Antonio was
filed by the Spanish consul, on behalf of the representatives of Captain
Ferrer, and claims are also filed by merchants of Cuba for parts of the
cargo of the vessel, denying salvage, and asserting their right to have
the same delivered to them under the treaty. The negores, Antonio
excepted, filed an answer denying that they were slaves, or the property
of Ruiz, or Montez; and denying the right of the Court under the
Constitution and laws of the United States to exercise any jurisdiction
over their persons. They asserted that they were native free-born
Africans, and ought of right to be free; that they had been, in April
1839, kidnapped in Africa, and had been carried in a vessel engaged in
the slave trade from the coast of Africa to Cuba, for the purpose of
being sold; and that Ruiz and Montez, knowing these facts, had purchased
them, put them on board the Amistad, intending to carry them to be held
as slaves for life, to another part of Cuba, and that, on the voyage,
they rose on the master, took possession of the vessel, and were
intending to proceed to Africa, or to some free state, when they were
taken possession of by the United States armed vessel, the Washington.
After evidence had been given by the parties, and all the documents of
the vessel and cargo, with the alleged passports, and the clearance from
Havana had been produced the District Court made a decree, by which all
claims to salvage of the negroes were rejected, and salvage amounting to
one-third of the vessel and cargo, was allowed to Lieutenant Gedney, and
the officers and crew of the Washington. The claim of the
representatives of Captain Ferrer, to Antonio, was allowed: the claims
of Ruiz and Montez being included in the claim of the Spanish minister,
and of the minister of Spain, to the negroes as slaves, or to have them
delivered to the Spanish minister, under the treaty, to be sent to Cuba,
were rejected: and the Court decreed that the negroes should be
delivered to the President of the United States, to be sent to Africa,
pursuant to the act of Congress of 3d March, 1819. From this decree the
District Attorney of the United States appealed to the Circuit Court,
except so far as the same related to Antonio. The owners of the cargo of
the Amistad also appealed from that part of the decree which allowed
salvage on their goods. Ruiz or Montez did not appeal, nor did the
representatives of the owner of the Amistad. The Circuit Court of
Connecticut, by a pro forma decree, affirmed the decree of the District
Court, reserving the question of salvage on the merchandise on board the
Amistad. The United States appealed from this decree. The decree of the
Circuit Court was affirmed; saving that part of the same, which directed
the negroes to be delivered to the President of the United States, to be
sent to Africa; which was reversed, and the negroes were declared to be
free.
The sixth article of the treaty with Spain, of 1795, continued in full
force, in this particular, by the treaty ratified in 1821, seems to have
had principally in view, cases where the property of the subjects of
either state, had been taken possession of within the territorial
jurisdiction of the other, during war. The eighth article provides for
cases where the shipping of the inhabitants of either state are forced,
through stress of weather, pursuit of pirates, or enemies, or any other
urgent necessity, to seek shelter in the ports of the other. There may
well be some doubts entertained whether the case of the Amistad, in its
actual circumstances, falls within the purview of this article.
The ninth article of the treaty provides, that all ships and
merchandise, which shall be rescued out of the hands of any pirates and
robbers, on the high seas, which shall be brought into some port of
either state, shall be delivered to the officers of the port in order to
be taken care of, and "restored entire to the proprietary, as soon
as due and sufficient proof shall be made concerning the property
thereof." To bring the case of the Amistad within this article, it
is essential to establish: First, that the negroes, under all the
circumstances, fall within the description of merchandise, in the sense
of the treaty. Secondly, That there has been a rescue of them on the
high seas, out of the hands of pirates and robbers. Thirdly, That Ruiz
and Montez are the true proprietors of the negroes, and have established
their title by competent proofs. If those negroes were, at the time,
lawfully held as slaves under the laws of Spain, and recognised by those
laws as property capable of being bought and sold, no reason is seen why
this may not be deemed, within the intent of the treaty, to be included
under the denomination of merchandise, and ought, as such, to be
restored to the claimants; for upon that point the laws of Spain would
seem to furnish the proper rule of interpretation. But, admitting that
to be the construction of the treaty, it is clear in the opinion of the
Court, that neither of the other essential facts and requisites has been
established by proof and the onus probandi of both lies upon the
claimants, to give rise to the casus foederis.
The negroes were never the lawful slaves of Ruiz, or Montez, or of any
other Spanish subject. They are natives of Africa; and were kidnapped
there, and wedre unlawfully transported to Cuba, in violation of the
laws and treaties of Spain, and of the most solemn edicts and
declarations of that government.
By the laws, treaties, and edicts of Spain, the African slave trade is
utterly abolished; the dealing in that trade is deemed a heinous crime;
and the negroes thereby introduced into the dominions of Spain, are
declared to be free.
There is no pretence to say the negroes of the Amistad are "pirates"
and "robbers;" as they were kidnapped Africans, who, by the
laws of Spain itself were entitled to their freedom.
Although public documents of the government accompanying property found
on board of the private ships of a foreign nation, are to be deemed
prima facie evidence of the facts which they state, yet they are always
open to be impugned for fraud; and whether that fraud be in the original
obtaining of those documents, or in the subsequent fraudulent and
illegal use of them, where once it is satisfactorily established, it
over-throws all their sanctity, and destroys them as proof.
Fraud will vitiate any, even the most solemn transactions; and any
asserted title founded upon it, is utterly void.
The language of the treaty with Spain of 1795, requires the proprietor "to
make due and sufficient proof" of his property; and that proof
cannot be deemed either due or sufficient, which is stained with fraud.
Nothing is more clear in the laws of nations as an established rule to
regulate their rights and duties, and intercourse, than the doctrine
that the ship's papers are prima facie evidence of what they state; and
that if they are shown to be fraudulent, they are not to be held proof
of any valid title whatever.This rule is applied in prize cases; and is
just as applicable to the transctions of civil intercourse between
nations in times of peace.
In the solemn treaties between nations it never can be presumed that
either state intends to provide the means of perpetrating or protecting
frauds; but all the provisions are to be construed as intended to be
applied to bona fide transactions.
The seventeenth article of the treaty with Spain which provides for
certain passports and certificates as evidence of property on board of
the ships of both states, is, in its terms, applicable only to cases
where either of the parties is engaged in war. This article required a
certain form of passport to be agreed upon by the parties and annexed to
the treaty. It never was annexed: and, therefore, in the case of The
Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheaton, 1, it is held inoperative.
Supposing the African negroes on board the Amisted not to be slaves,
but kidnapped, and free negroes, the treaty with Spain cannot be
obligatory upon them; and the United States are bound to respect their
rights, as much as those of Spanish subjects. The conflict of rights
between the parties, under such circumstances, becomes positive and
inevitable, and must be decided upon the invariable principles of
justice and international law.
The treaty with Spain never could have been intended to take away the
equal rights of all foreigners who should assert their claims to equal
justice before the Courts of the United States; or to deprive such
foreigners of the protection given to them by other treaties, or by the
general laws of nations.
There is no ground to assert that the case of the negroes who were on
board of the Amistad comes within the provisions of the act of Congress
of 1799, or of any other of the prohibitory slave-trade acts. These
negroes were never taken from Africa, or brought to the United States in
contravention of these acts. When the Amistad arrived she was in
possession of the negroes, asserting their freedom; and in no sense
could possibly intend to import themselves into the United States as
slaves, or for sale as slaves.
The carrying of the Amistad and her cargo into Connecticut by
Lieutenant Gedney, and the officers and crew of the Washington, was a
highly meritorious and useful service to the proprietors of the ship and
cargo, and such, as by the general principles of the maritime law, is
always deemed a just foundation for salvage. The rate allowed by the
Court, (one-third,) does not seem beyond the exercise of a sound
discretion, under the very peculiar and embarrassing circumstances of
the case. | |
| Mr.
Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the case of an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court of
the District of Connecticut, sitting in admiralty. The leading facts, as
they appear upon the transcript of the proceedings, are as follows: On
the 27th of June, 1839, the schooner L'Amistad, being the property of
Spanish subjects, cleared out from the port of Havana, in the island of
Cuba, for Puerto Principe, in the same island. On board of the schooner
were the captain, Ransom Ferrer, and Jose Ruiz, and Pedro Montez, all
Spanish subjects. The former had with him a negro boy, named Antonio,
claimed to be his slave. Jose Ruiz had with him forty-nine negroes,
claimed by him as his slaves, and stated to be his property, in a
certain pass or document, signed by the Governor General [p*588] of
Cuba. Pedro Montez had with him four other negroes, also claimed by him
as his slaves, and stated to be his property, in a similar pass or
document, also signed by the Governor General of Cuba. On the voyage,
and before the arrival of the vessel at her port of destination, the
negroes rose, killed the captain, and took possession of her. On the
26th of August, the vessel was discovered by Lieutenant Gedney, of the
United States brig Washington, at anchor on the high seas, at the
distance of half a mile from the shore of Long Island. A part of the
negroes were then on shore at Culloden Point, Long Island; who were
seized by Lieutenant Gedney, and brought on board. The vessel, with the
negroes and other persons on board, was brought by Lieutenant Gedney
into the district of Connecticut, and there libelled for salvage in the
District Court of the United States. A libel for salvage was also filed
by Henry Green and Pelatiah Fordham, of Sag Harbour, Long Island. On the
18th of September, Ruiz and Montez filed claims and libels, in which
they asserted their ownership of the negroes as their slaves, and of
certain parts of the cargo, and prayed that the same might be "delivered
to them, or to the representatives of her Catholic majesty, as might be
most proper." On the 19th of September, the Attorney of the United
states, for the district of Connecticut, filed an information or libel,
setting forth, that the Spanish minister had officially presented to the
proper department of the government of the United States, a claim for
the restoration of the vessel, cargo, and slaves, as the property of
Spanish subjects, which had arrived within the jurisdictional limits of
the United States, and were taken possession of by the said public armed
brig of the United States; under such circumstances as made it the duty
of the United States to cause the same to be restored to the true
proprietors, pursuant to the treaty between the United States and Spain:
and praying the Court, on its being made legally to appear that the
claim of the Spanish minister was well founded, to make such order for
the disposal of the vesel, cargo, and slaves, as would best enable the
United States to comply with their treaty stipulations. But if it should
appear, that the negroes were persons transported from Africa, in
violation of the laws of the United States, and brought within the
United States contrary to the same laws; he then prayed the Court to
make such order for their removal to the coast of Africa, pursuant to
the laws of the United States, as it should deem fit.
On the 19th of November, the Attorney of the United States [p*589]
filed a second information or libel, similar to the first, with the
exception of the second prayer above set forth in his former one. On the
same day, Antonio G. Vega, the vice-consul of Spain, for the state of
Connecticut, filed his libel, alleging that Antonio was a slave, the
property of the representatives of Ramon Ferrer, and praying the Court
to cause him to be delivered to the said vice-consul, that he might be
returned by him to his lawful owner in the island of Cuba.
On the 7th of January, 1840, the negroes, Cinque and others, with the
exception of Antonio, by their counsel, filed an answer, denying that
they were slaves, or the property of Ruiz and Montez, or that the Court
could, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or under any
treaty, exercise any jurisdiction over their persons, by reason of the
premises; and praying that they might be dismissed. They specially set
forth and insist in this answer, that they were native born Africans;
born free, and still of right ought to be free and not slaves; that they
were, on or about the 15th of April, 1839, unlawfully kidnapped, and
forcibly and wrongfully carried on board a certain vessel on the coast
of Africa, which was unlawfully engaged in the slave trade, and were
unlawfully transported in the same vessel to the island of Cuba, for the
purpose of being there unlawfully sold as slaves; that Ruiz and Montez,
well knowing the premises, made a pretended purchase of them: that
afterwards, on or about the 28th of June, u839, Ruiz and Montez,
confederating with Ferrer, (captain of the Amistad,) caused them,
without law or right, to be placed on board of the Amistad, to be
transported to some place unknown to them, and there to be enslaved for
life; that, on the voyage, they rose on the master, and took possession
of the vessel, intending to return therewith to their native country, or
to seek an asylum in some free state; and the vessel arrived, about the
26th of August, 1839, off Montauk Point, near Long Island; a part of
them were sent on shore, and were seized by Lieutenant Gedney, and
carried on board; and all of them were afterwards brought by him into
the district of Connecticut.
On the 7th of January, 1840, Jose Antonio Tellincas, and Messrs. Aspe
and Laca, all Spanish subjects, residing in Cuba, filed their [p*590]
claims, as owners to certain portions of the goods found on board of the
schooner L'Amistad.
On the same day, all the libellants and claimants, by their counsel,
except Jose Ruiz and Pedro Montez, (whose libels and claims, as stated
of record, respectively, were pursued by the Spanish minister, the same
being merged in his claims,) appeared, and the negroes also appeared by
their counsel; and the case was heard on thie libels, claims, answers,
and testimony of witnesses.
On the 23d day of January, 1840, the District Court made a decree. By
that decree, the Court rejected the claim of Green and Fordham for
salvage, but allowed salvage to Lieutenant Gedney and others, on the
vessel and cargo, of one-third of the value thereof, but not on the
negroes, Cinque and others; it allowed the claim of Tellincas, and Aspe
and Laca with the exception of the above-mentioned salvage; it dismissed
the libels and claims of Ruiz and Montez, with costs, as being included
under the claim of the Spanish minister; it allowed the claim of the
Spanish vice-consul for Antonio, on behalf of Ferrer's representatives;
it rejected the claims of Ruiz and Montez for the delivery of the
negroes, but admitted them for the cargo, with the exception of the
above-mentioned salvage; it rejected the claim made by the Attorney of
the United States on behalf of the Spanish minister, for the restoration
of the negroes under the treaty; but it decreed that they should be
delivered to the President of the United States, to be transported to
Africa, pursuant to the act of 3d March, 1819.
From this decree the District Attorney, on behalf of the United States,
appealed to the Circuit Court, except so far as related to the
restoration of the slave Antonio. The claimants, Tellincas, and Aspe and
Laca, also appealed from that part of the decree which awarded salvage
on the property respectively claimed by them. No appeal was interposed
by Ruiz or Montez, or on behalf of the representatives of the owners of
the Amistad. The Circuit Court, by a mere pro forma decree, affirmed the
decree of the District Court, reserving the question of salvage upon the
claims of Tellincas, and Aspe and Laca. And from that decree the present
appeal has been brought to this Court.
The cause has been very elaborately argued, as well upon the [p*591]
merits, as upon a motion on behalf of the appellees to dismiss the
appeal. On the part of the United States, it has been contended, 1. That
due and sufficient proof concerning the property has been made to
authorize the restitution of the vessel, cargo, and negroes to the
Spanish subjects on whose behalf they are claimed pursuant to the treaty
with Spain, of the 27th of October, 1795. 2. That the United States had
a right to intervene in the manner in which they have done, to obtain a
decree for the restitution of the property, upon the application of the
Spanish minister. These propositions have been strenuously denied on the
other side. Other collateral and incidental points have been stated,
upon which it is not necessary at this moment to dwell.
Before entering upon the discussion of the main points involved in this
interesting and important controversy, it may be necessary to say a few
words as to the actual posture of the case as it now stands before us.
In the first place, then, the only parties now before the Court on one
side, are the United States, intervening for the sole purpose of
procuring restitution of the property as Spanish property, pursuant to
the treaty, upon the grounds stated by the other parties claiming the
property in their respective libels. The United States do not assert any
property in themselves, or any violation of their own rights, or
sovereignty, or laws, by the acts complained of. They do not insist that
these negroes have been imported into the United States, in
contravention of our own slave trade acts. They do not seek to have
these negroes delivered up for the purpose of being transported to Cuba
as pirates or robbers, or as fugitive criminals against the laws of
Spain. They do not assert that the seizure, and bringing the vessel, and
cargo, and negroes into port, by Lieutenant Gedney, for the purpose of
adjudication, is a tortious act. They simply confine themselves to the
right of the Spanish claimants to the restitution of their property,
upon the facts asserted in their respective allegations.
In the next place, the parties before the Court on the other side as
appellees, are Lieutenant Gedney, on his libel for salvage, and the
negroes, (Cinque, and others,) asserting themselves, in their answer,
not to be slaves, but free native Africans, kidnapped [p*592] in their
own country, and illegally transported by force from that country; and
now entitled to maintain their freedom.
No question has been here made, as to the proprietary interests in the
vessel and cargo. It is admitted that they belong to Spanish subjects,
and that they ought to be restored. The only point on this head is,
whether the restitution ought to be upon the payment of salvage or not?
The main controversy is, whether these negroes are the property of Ruiz
and Montez, and ought to be delivered up; and to this, accordingly, we
shall first direct our attention.
It has been argued on behalf of the United States, that the Court are
bound to deliver them up, according to the treaty of 1795, with Spain,
which has in this particular been continued in full force, by the treaty
of 1819, ratified in 1821. The sixth article of that treaty, seems to
have had, principally, in view cases where the property of the subjects
of either state had been taken possession of within the territorial
jurisdiction of the other, during war. The eighth article provides for
cases where the shipping of the inhabitants of either state are forced,
through stress of weather, pursuit of pirates, or enemies, or any other
urgent necessity, to seek shelter in the ports of the other. There may
well be some doubt entertained, whether the present case, in its actual
circumstances, falls within the purview of this article. But it does not
seem necessary, for reasons hereafter stated, absolutely to decide it.
The ninth article provides, "that all ships and merchandise, of
what nature soever, which shall be rescued out of the hands of any
pirates or robbers, on the high seas, shall be brought into some port of
either state, and shall be delivered to the custody of the officers of
that port, in order to be taken care of and restored entire to the true
proprietor, as soon as due and sufficient proof shall be made concerning
the property thereof." This is the article on which the main
reliance is placed on behalf of the United States, for the restitution
of these negroes. To bring the case within the article, it is essential
to establish, First, That these negroes, under all the circumstances,
fall within the description of merchandise, in the sense of the treaty.
Secondly, That there has been a rescue of them on the high seas, out of
the hands of the pirates and robbers; which, in the present case, can
only be, by showing that they [p*593] themselves are pirates and
robbers; and, Thirdly, That Ruiz and Montez, the asserted proprietors,
are the true proprietors, and have established their title by competent
proof.
If these negroes were, at the time, lawfully held as slaves under the
laws of Spain, and recognised by those laws as property capable of being
lawfully bought and sold; we see no reason why they may not justly be
deemed within the intent of the treaty, to be included under the
denomination of merchandise, and, as such, ought to be restored to the
claimants: for, upon that point, the laws of Spain would seem to furnish
the proper rule of interpretation. But, admitting this, it is clear, in
our opinion, that neither of the other essential facts and requisites
has been established in proof; and the onus probandi of both lies upon
the claimants to give rise to the causes foederis. It is plain beyond
controversy, if we examine the evidence, that these negroes never were
the lawful slaves of Ruiz or Montez, or of any other Spanish subjects.
They are natives of Africa, and were kidnapped there, and were
unlawfully transported to Cuba, in violation of the laws and treaties of
Spain, and the most solemn edicts and declarations of that government.
By those laws, and treaties, and edicts, the African slave trade is
utterly abolished; the dealing in that trade is deemed a heinous crime;
and the negroes thereby introduced into the dominions of Spain, are
declared to be free. Ruiz and Montez are proved to have made the
pretended purchase of these negroes, with a full knowledge of all the
circumstances. And so cogent and irresistible is the evidence in this
respect, that the District Attorney has admitted in open Court, upon the
record, that these negroes were native Africans, and recently imported
into Cuba, as alleged in their answers to the libels in the case. The
supposed proprietary interest of Ruiz and Montez, is completely
displaced, if we are at liberty to look at the evidence of the
admissions of the District Attorney.
If, then, these negroes are not slaves, but are kidnapped Africans,
who, by the laws of Spain itself, are entitled to their freedom, and
were kidnapped and illegally carried to Cuba, and illegally detained and
restrained on board of the Amistad; there is no pretence to say, that
they are pirates or robbers. We may lament the dreadful acts, by which
they asserted their liberty, and took possession of the Amistad, and
endeavoured to regain their native [p*594] country; but they cannot be
deemed pirates or robbers in the sense of the law of nations, or the
treaty with Spain, or the laws of Spain itself; at least so far as those
laws have been brought to our knowledge. Nor do the libels of Ruiz or
Montez assert them to be such.
This posture of the facts would seem, of itself, to put an end to the
Whole inquiry upon the merits. But it is argued, on behalf of the United
States, that the ship, and cargo, and negroes were duly documented as
belonging to Spanish subjects, and this Court have no right to look
behind these documents; that full faith and credit is to be given to
them; and that they are to be held conclusive evidence in this cause,
even although it sould be established by the most satisfactory proofs,
that they have been obtained by the grossest frauds and impositions upon
the constituted authorities of Spain.To this argument we can, in no
wise, assent. There is nothing in the treaty which justifies or sustains
the argument.We do not here meddle with the point, whether there has
been any connivance in this illegal traffic, on the part of any of the
colonial authorities or subordinate officers of Cuba; because, in our
view, such an examination is unnecessary, and ought not to be pursued,
unless it were indispensable to public justice, although it has been
strongly pressed at the bar. What we proceed upon is this, that although
public documents of the government, accompanying property found on board
of the private ships of a foreign nation, certainly are to be deemed
prima facie evidence of the facts which they purport to state, yet they
are always open to be impugned for fraud; and whether that fraud be in
the original obtaining of these documents, or in the subsequent
fraudulent and illegal use of them, when once it is satisfactorily
established, it overthrows all their sanctity, and destroys them as
proof. Fraud will vitiate any, even the most solemn transactions; and an
asserted title to property, founded upon it, is utterly void. The very
language of the ninth article of the treaty of 1795, requires the
proprietor to make due and sufficient proof of his property. And how can
that proof be deemed either due or sufficient, which is but a connected,
and stained tissue of fraud? This is not a mere rule of municipal
jurisprudence. Nothing is more clear in the law of nations, as an
established rule to regulate their rights, and duties, [p*595] and
intercourse, than the doctrine, that the ship's papers are but prima
facie evidence, and that, if they are shown to be fraudulent, they are
not to be held proof of any valid title. This rule is familiarly
applied, and, indeed, is of every-days occurrence in cases of prize, in
the contests between belligerents and neutrals, as is apparent from
numerous cases to be found in the Reports of this Court; and it is just
as applicable to the transactions of civil intercourse between nations
in times of peace. If a private ship, clothed with Spanish papers,
should enter the ports of the United States, claiming the privileges,
and immunities, and rights belonging to bona fide subjects of Spain,
under our treaties or laws, and she should, in reality, belong to the
subjects of another nation, which was not entitled to any such
privileges, immunities, or rights, and the proprietors were seeking, by
fraud, to cover their own illegal acts, under the flag of Spain; there
can be no doubt, that it would be the duty of our Courts to strip off
the disguise, and to look at the case according to its naked realities.
In the solemn treaties between nations, it can never be presumed that
either state intends to provide the means of perpetrating or protecting
frauds; but all the provisions are to be construed as intended to be
applied to bona fide transactions. The seventeenth article of the treaty
with Spain, which provides for certain passports and certificates, as
evidence of property on board of the ships of both states, is, in its
terms, applicable only to cases where either of the parties is engaged
in a war. This article required a certain form of passport to be agreed
upon by the parties, and annexed to the treaty. It never was annexed;
and, therefore, in the case of the Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheaton, 1, it
was held inoperative.
It is also a most important consideration in the present case, which
ought not to be lost sight of, that, supposing these African negroes not
to be slaves, but kidnapped, and free negroes, the treaty with Spain
cannot be obligatory upon them; and the United States are bound to
respect their rights as much as those of Spanish subjects. The conflict
of rights between the parties under such circumstances, becomes positive
and inevitable, and must be decided upon the eternal principles of
justice and international law. If the contest were about any goods on
board of this ship, to which American citizens asserted a title, which
was [p*596] denied by the Spanish claimants, there could be no doubt of
the right of such American citizens to litigate their claims before any
competent American tribunal, notwithstanding the treaty with Spain. A
fortiori, the doctrine must apply where human life and human liberty are
in issue; and constitute the very essence of the controversy. The
treaty with Spain never could have intended to take away the equal
rights of all foreigners, who should contest their claims before any of
our Courts, to equal justice; or to deprive such foreigners of the
protection given them by other treaties, or by the general law of
nations. Upon the merits of the case, then, there does not seem to us to
be any ground for doubt, that these negroes ought to be deemed free; and
that the Spanish treaty interposes no obstacle to the just assertion of
their rights.
There is another consideration growing out of this part of the case,
which necessarily rises in judgment. It is observable, that the United
States, in their original claim, filed it in the alternative, to have
the negroes, if slaves and Spanish property, restored to the
proprietors; or, if not slaves, but negroes who had been transported
from Africa, in violation of the laws of the United States, and brought
into the United States contrary to the same laws, then the Court to pass
an order to enable the United States to remove such persons to the coast
of Africa, to be delivered there to such agent as may be authorized to
receive and provide for them. At a subsequent period, this last
alternative claim was not insisted on, and another claim was interposed,
omitting it; from which the conclusion naturally arises that it was
abandoned. The decree of the District Court, however, contained an order
for the delivery of the negroes to the United States, to be transported
to the coast of Africa, under the act of the 3d of March, 1819, ch. 224.
The United States do not now insist upon any affirmance of this part of
the decree; and, in our judgment, upon the admitted facts, there is no
ground to assert that the case comes within the purview of the act of
1819, or of any other of our prohibitory slave trade acts. These negroes
were never taken from Africa, or brought to the United States in
contravention of those acts. When the Amistad arrived she was in
possession of the negroes, asserting their freedom; and in no sense
could they possibly intend to import themselves here, as [p*597] slaves,
or for sale as slaves. In this view of the matter, that part of the
decree of the District Court is unmaintainable, and must be reversed.
The view which has been thus taken of this case, upon the merits, under
the first point, renders it wholly unnecessary for us to give any
opinion upon the other point, as to the right of the United States to
intervene in this case in the manner already stated. We dismiss this,
therefore, as well as several minor points made at the argument.
As to the claim of Lieutenant Gedney for the salvage service, it is
understood that the United States do not now desire to interpose any
obstacle to the allowance of it, if it is deemed reasonable by the
Court. It was a highly meritorious and useful service to the proprietors
of the ship and cargo; and such as, by the general principles of
maritime law, is always deemed a just foundation for salvage. The rate
allowed by the Court, does not seem to us to have been beyond the
exercise of a sound discretion, under the very peculiar and embarrassing
circumstances of the case.
Upon the whole, our opinion is, that the decree of the Circuit Court,
affirming that of the District Court, ought to be affirmed, except so
far as it directs the negroes to be delivered to the President, to be
transported to Africa, in pursuance of the act of the 3d of March, 1819;
and, as to this, it ought to be reversed: and that the said negroes be
declared to be free, and be dismissed from the custody of the Court, and
go without day.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the
Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Connecticut, and
was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of
this Court, that there is error in that part of the decree of the
Circuit Court, affirming the decree of the District Court, which ordered
the said negroes to be delivered to the President of the United States,
to be transported to Africa, in pursuance of the act of congress of the
3d of March, 1819; and that, as to that part, it ought to be reversed:
and in all other respects, that the said decree of the [p*598] Circuit
Court ought to be affirmed. It is therefore ordered adjudged, and
decreed by this Court, that the decree of the said Circuit Court be, and
the same is hereby, affirmed, except as to the part aforesaid, and as to
that part, that it be reversed; and that the cause be remanded to the
Circuit Court, with directions to enter, in lieu of that part, a decree,
that the said negroes be and are hereby, declared to be free, and that
they be dismissed from the custody of the Court, and be discharged from
the suit and go thereof quit without delay. | |