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To The People of
the State of New York:
OOOOAs CONNECTED with the subject of
revenue, we may with propriety consider that of economy. The money
saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there
will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people.
If the States are united under one government, there will be but one
national civil list to support; if they are divided into several
confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to
be provided for--and each of them, as to the principal departments,
coextensive with that which would be necessary for a government of the
whole. The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected
sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger
to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the
dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three
confederacies--one consisting of the four Northern, another of the
four Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little
probability that there would be a greater number. According to this
distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory
larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man
will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly
regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or
institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention. When
the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires
the same energy of government and the same forms of administration
which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits
not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we can
measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of any
given number of individuals; but when we consider that the island of
Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies,
contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect upon the
degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a
society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that the
like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in
a society far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and
exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and
can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by
a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
OOOOThe supposition that each
confederacy into which the States would be likely to be divided would
require a government not less comprehensive than the one proposed,
will be strengthened by another supposition, more probable than that
which presents us with three confederacies as the alternative to a
general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial
considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the
different States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion
they will most naturally league themselves under two governments. The
four Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of
national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be expected to
unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to
oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that
confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that would facilitate her
accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a
frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor
do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even
Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern
league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own
navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and
dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various
circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the
encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give
unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the
purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to
confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy. As
she must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent
with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker
power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the
Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid
being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of
Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there
is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of that
State.
OOOONothing can be more evident than
that the thirteen States will be able to support a national government
better than one half, or one third, or any number less than the whole.
This reflection must have great weight in obviating that objection to
the proposed plan, which is founded on the principle of expense; an
objection, however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it,
will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.
OOOOIf, in addition to the consideration
of a plurality of civil lists, we take into view the number of persons
who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communication
between the different confederacies against illicit trade, and who in
time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and
if we also take into view the military establishments which it has
been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts
of the several nations into which the States would be divided, we
shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious
to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and
liberty of every part.
OOOOPUBLIUS.
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