0000Written in late 1787 and early 1788 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, the Federalist Papers make the case for replacing the Articles of Confederation with the recently created Constitution. The former, by erecting a weak central government, disconnected from the citizen and at the mercy of the sovereign states, was by all accounts a disaster. The Federalists proposed a strong federal government, able to make laws directly for the people, to control those aspects of the nation common to all - for example commerce and defense - and to speak with once voice to foreign powers. Many Americans opposed such a concentration of power, and the papers were written to address that opposition.
0000The Federalist Papers are among the few documents of American History which discursively provide a philosophy of government and of human nature. They make fascinating reading not merely as an historical artifact; but for the light they shine on events as recent as this morning's political news.
0000Along with the links below, we have supplied a brief subject index at the end of this page.

Hamilton anticipates, in general, the tenor of arguments likely to be persued by those opposed to the new Constitution, and lays out, again generally, what will be his arguments for it.

Hamilton argues that America is one nation both historically, culturally and geographically. He poses the choice between fullfilling that fact through the creation of a robust Federal Government, or endangering our nationhood by continuing with the then present Confederation as a collection of sovereign states or separation into confederacies of several states.

Jay argues that the nation united under a strong central goverment is more of a guaranty of safety from foreign "arms and influence" that thirteen smaller governments.

Jay further argues that not only is a strong central government a better guarantor of safety should actual hostilities occur, it is also a better preventative of their not occurring at all, as the perceived weekness of the separate soveriegn states might invite foreign invasion and interference.

Jay continued his warnings regarding the division of America into confederacies of states, and the conflict that could result.

Hamilton returns to the theme of the potential for discord and hostility between the states, or between factions of states under the Confederation. He cites both human nature and the experience of history and incidents from America's own brief past to prove his point.

Hamilton outlines all the possible motives and opportunities the states might have for conflict, including commercial relations, disputes over the open territories in the West, perceived inequities in apportionment of the public debt, and the states' desire to protect the interests of their citizens.

Hamilton argues that war between the states will not only be more viscious than war between nations had traditionally been, but that the result of endless conflict would soon turn the states into petty tyrannies.

Less a defense of the Union as a safegaurd against domestic unrest, this is Hamilton's answer to those who doubt the very viability of a union or of republican government. Acknowledging the failed republics of history, Hamilton's point is that knowledge of how republican governments were to be formed and maintained is far advanced over the past. Moreover, to those who cite Montesquieu for the viability of only tiny states as republics, he counters that they did not read all of Montesquieu, as the philosophe had praised the idea of a "Confederate Republic", the very form of government Hamilton envisions. Hamilton also outlines the relative powers of the states and the national government.

Here Madison discusses the efficacy of Union in preventing the rise and damage of "factions". Madison argues that human passion and cupidity - a danger in small, direct democracies such as a state - would be dissolved in a representative government covering a large territory. Certainly among the most eloquent of the Papers, the 10th reflects Madison's ideas on liberty, order and human nature.

Hamilton argues that the states are best served in trade by showing a common face to the world and by organizing their commercial relations into one voice that speaks for all. Moreover, he argues that without a navy, organized and directed by one central authority, the individual states would always be at the mercy of foreign powers who could direct or disrupt their trade at will.

Hamilton argues that the collection of revenues (which he envisions will be based on excise and consumption taxes) would be far more efficiently and equitably collected by a national government than by the states individually.

In answer to concerns over the expense of a central government, Hamilton argues that it would govern the country far more economically than thirteen state governents. An interesting aspect of the 13th is Hamilton's speculations on what lines and for what motives the thirteen states might organize themselves into two or three confederations.

Madison meets the objections of those who argue that America is too large for one government to effectively govern, actually computing and comparing distances representatives would have to travel to a seat of governmet. In his final paragraph, he also answers those whose objection to a national government is its novelty. It makes excellent reading.

Hamilton limns the weaknesses of the Confederation: its inability to act, to pay its debts and to defend its territories and interests.
He goes on to attck those whose remedy is to increase the power of the federal government without reducing the sovereignty of the states. This, Hamilton argues, is contradictory and futile. Instead, Hamilton returns to a theme he maintains throughout the Papers; that instead of having to act through the states, the national government must be able to legislate for individual citizens, and be able to enforce those laws. As he says, "...we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, --the only proper objects of government." He goes on to frame this argumuent in the context of the meaning of the law and the exigencies of human nature. Like Madison's 10th, the 15th outlines fundamental principles inherent to American government.

Hamilton returns to the themes of Federalist No. 15, stressing the tendency of confederacies of sovereign states to either drift toward internecine wars, or to simply drift apart toward anarchy. He again advances the virtues of a national government which bypasses the states to govern its citizens directly.

To fears that a strengthened federal government would usurp the powers of the states, Hamilton answers that local and state issues would be too minor and troublesome for the federal government to bother with. Indeed, Hamilton argues that well-run state governments would so engender the loyalty of thier citizens, that the federal government might better fear the loss of its powers to the states.

Here the Confederation is compared to the confederations among the ancient Greek city-states. Because the individual cities preserved too much of their own sovereignty, common resolve and common action was almost impossible. The strong cities corrupted and dominated the weak, and internal rivalries and wars invited conquest from their neighbors.

Hamilton and Madison here compare the Confederation to the German Empire after Charlemagne. Because Charlemagne and his descendents left the power of their vassals intact, the vassals eventually gained defacto independence of the Emperor, an independence that left Germany, after the 12th century, wracked by internal conflicts and a constant prey to its neighbors.

Hamilton and Madison take up the similarity of the Confederation and the Netherlands where the union is marred by the sovereignty of its members and the need for unanimity among them to address important issues, including an inability to supply regular tax revenues.
The impracticability of the Dutch Constitution causes the members of its Confederation to often ignore it, a practice which invites tyranny.

Hamilton points out that the Federal Government under the Confederation has no power to enforce its own laws, nor is there any "mutual guaranty" among the states against internal disorders and insurrection.
Hamilton also objects to the system of quotas based on land and population by which the states fund the Federal Government. He argues that these quotas have nothing to do with the actual wealth of any particular state and leave some to pay more, and some to pay less, than their fair share. Instead of taxing the states, Hamilton advocates a consumption tax on people.

Here Hamilton argues that the Federal Government's inability to regulate commerce and the lack of a federal judiciary precludes its ability to make treaties with foreign countries because it hasn't the power to enforce them. The lack of commerce power also leaves open the likelihood of trade conflict between the states.
He also points out that equal power among the states is unjust because it gives smaller states as much power as the larger, thus violating the principle of majority rule, and tends to grant veto power to a minority. Among other things, Hamilton believes this invites foreign tampering in the affairs of the nation.
He also believes it unwise to invest all national power in a single body. (The Confederation only created a unicameral Congress)
Finally, Hamilton states that the Confederation lacks legitimacy for never having been ratified by the people.

Hamilton here states the need for a new, effective Constitution and suggests an outline of its proposed powers. He begins by saying that since the Federal Government has been given the responsibility to wage war, it must be given the power to do so as well, including the power to levy troops and raise revenues. Indeed, he argues that whatever respnsibility is given the Federal Government, it nust be given the power to fulfill it.

Hamilton answers concerns about the keeping of standing armies in time of peace by pointing out that under the Constitution the levying and maintaining of troops would be under the power of a popularly elected legislature.
He further argues that neither the majority of the states, nor even the Articles of Confederation, prohibited the keeping of standing armies in peace time.
He finishes by arguing that even in "peace time" the nation is surrounded by enemies, and peace may depend on their awareness that an army stands ready to defend it.

The argument that states should have charge of defense is first met by Hamilton's observation that as the dangers to the nation are common, they should be faced and funded in common.
He goes on to argue that inequities in the resources of individual states would lead to inequities in their military power, then to fears, jealousies and conflict; that the ambiguity of the word "peace" would tend to render the provision meaningless; and that the prohibition would mean the nation could not prepare for war until it was upon them.
Finally, he points out that it is unwise to make laws contrary to the needs of society - as he believes ones prohibiting the keeping of standing armies in peace time to be - as such will almost certainly be ignored, and that will tend to the corrosion of reverence for the law itself.

Hamilton argues against those who would limit the proposed Legislature's power to raise and maintain armies in times of peace. He reminds his readers that when their English ancestors took this power away from the king, they did not extinguish it entirely, but lodged it in Parliament.
He finishes by listing the limits already inherent to the Constitution, and to the nation itself, that would preclude the Legislature's use of this power for mischief.

In answer to those who predict that the people will resist the suthority of a federal government, making the military necessary to enforce its laws, Hamilton writes that so long as the government is well-administered, there is no reason to suppose the people will resist it.
He goes on to list the advantages of a federal government over the state governments, and predicts that a federal government which is part of the life of the individual citizen, by custom and familiarity, will accrue more loyalty to itself than one distant.
He finishes by pointing out that any government can go bad, but that the Constitution forms the one least likely to do so.

Hamilton predicts that insurrections and rebellions will occur, and he allows that small disturbances can be met by the state militias; but points out that serious rebellion could be put down only with an army. Since, he argues, that a standing army would be required in any case, isn't a common army more conducive to peace and liberty than an army in each state, liable to be used on each other?
Moreover, he argues, a strong federal government with strong states would create a mutual check on the likelihood of tyranny arising in any, whereas tyranny in a sovereign state under a powerless central government might arise with nothing to oppose it.

Hamilton advocates assigning the use of the states' militias to the Federal Government. To those who object that doing so would make the militias an instrument of tyranny, Hamilton responds that the necessity of training the entire male population of the nation to that point would so disrupt the social and economic life of the nation as to make it odious to the people.
He also points out that the militia, being composed of common citizens, would scarcely be inclined to assist a tyrant in the destruction of their own liberties, and ends with a pointed and eloquent Hamiltonian rant against his adversaries.

Hamilton outlines the necessity of a national power to tax, not merely for "military arrangements and operations" or for "the national civil list", but for "all matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury".
He goes on to make the point that requisitioning money from the states has proved a failure; that the only reliable source of revenue is to tax the people directly.
What Hamilton advocates is the fiscal independence of the federal Government from the states and the ability to tax up to the level of demands placed upon it.

Hamilton bases his assertion that the Federal Government should have a general power of direct taxation on a set of self-evident truths: generally, that a governement should have the powers and means necessary to the execution of the responsiblities given it. He adds that the power to tax should "...know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community."
He answers the fears of federal usurpation of the powers of the states by observing that such a danger should be sought among the composition and structure of the government, not its powers, and that in any case, in a republic, the people will maintain the equilibrium between the states and the Federal Government.

Hamilton agrees that states should maintain unfettered their own power to tax, with the sole exception of taxes on imports and exports.
He goes on to lay out how the respective powers of the states and the Federal Government under the Constitution are to be defined, concluding from that that it was obvious that the Constitution intended that the two sets of taxing powers, with the exception, should be "concurrent and coequal".

Hamilton addresses fears surrounding the "necessary and proper" and "supremacy" clauses in the Constitution. He observes that "...the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers" necessitates them; indeed, that they are somewhat redundant, and would have to be implied, even had they not neen stated.
He points out that, if it is accepted that the Federal Government should be granted certain powers under the Constitution, there should be no objection to granting the Federal Government the ability to act effectively to execute those powers.

Hamilton looks to Rome for an example of a government with two bodies possessing "concurrent jurisdiction", pointing out that it is certainly possible for such a polity to function, and function well.
He goes on to argue that it would be unadvisable to give either the Federal Government the power to regulate the taxing power of the state (except for import and export duties), or for the states to regulate the taxing power of the Federal Government, as the states and the Federal Government have different repsonsibilities, and neither may legitimately predict the future needs of the other.

Hamilton contends that confining the taxing power of the Federal Government to certain objects - in Hamilton's example, imports and exports - would over- and unfairly burden those objects as well as the industries, persons and states which depend on them. Equitable taxation requires a broad range of taxable items.
Somewhat unrelatedly, in response to a complaint that the proposed House of Representatives would not be representative of all classes of citizens, Hamilton admits that while this is true because the lower classes will tend to elect their betters to office, the House will represent all interests. Small landholders, he writes, will elect large landholders, and assuming, as Hamilton does, that all landholding interests are the same with respect to taxation, all landholding interests will be represented. The same, he writes, is true of manufactures; merchants will be elected by "mechanics" and small artisans, all of whose interests will coincide.
Hamilton's ideas on representation and the relationship between representive and constituent are interesting, as is also his conception of how society is constructed.

To the concern that the Federal Government would not tax competently due to its lack of knowledge of local conditions, Hamilton replies first that detailed knowledge isn't necessary, and second, that sufficient knowledge would be had from representatives in Congress. He also brushes aside the fear that federal taxes would interefer with state taxes by suggesting that the two simply tax different things.
Finally, Hamilton opines that the greater tax burden should fall on the wealthy, and states his opposition to the poll tax (though insists on keeping its use available when necessary).

Madison urges on his readers a dispassionate and objective examination of the proposed Constitution in light of the public good and the welfare of the nation. He also reminds them that the task of writing it was unprecidented and that its authors were neither more or less perfect than those who judge their efforts.
Among the difficulties faced by the Convention, Madison lists balancing stability with liberty and the principle of republicanism, drawing the line between federal and state government, managing the rivalries between the large and small states, and overcoming the inadequacies and ambiguities of language, itself.
Madison points out that it was miraculous the thing was done at all: "It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution."

Madison predicts that, as with the Articles of Confederation, the real flaws of the Constitution will become apparent only after it is put into effect. Fault-finding before that, he suggests, is beside the point. More seriously, he reminds his readers of the difficulties surrounding the creation of the Articles, implying that the current unanimity in the Constitutional Convention should be grasped before outside criticism destroys it: criticism which he goes on to list in detail. Madison admits that the Constitution may not be ideal, but it is better than what it replaces. He cautions his readers not to let the perfect become the enemy of the good.

Madison defines defines what, for him, is a republican government and concludes that the new government under the proposed Constitution is "...in the most rigid sense, conformable to it."
To the complaint that the proposed Constitution would extinguish the states in a "national" government instead of preserving their sovereignty in a "federal" one, Madison answers that the Constitution partakes of both types of governments, but that it preserves state sovereignty alike in its method of ratification, the body of the Senate, and in its extent, which leaves certain powers and responsibilities to the states alone.

Madison answers critics who charge that the authority of the Convention extended only to altering the Articles of Confederation, not to abolishing them.
Madison first argues that the Convention was also charged with the effective reform of the government, and that such reform was incompatible with the preservation of the Articles. He also points out that the power of the Convention to alter or amend the Articles did not necessarily preclude altering or amending it out of existence. Conversely, he also states that the propsed Constitution is less novel than its critics charge; indeed, that it hews more closely to the principles of the Articles than the Articles themselves.
He points out also that it is absurd to charge the members of the Convention with overstepping their powers since they have no power at all: the propsed Constitution is just that, a proposal, and has no force or effect until ratified.
Last, he argues that aside from their commission, it was the duty of the Convention to do as they did, and concludes that the new Constitution is such a superior document, it should be accepted no matter its provenance.

Madison begins a series of papers examining the Constitution in in two contexts concerning the distrubution of power: first, between the states and the federal government and second, between the organs of the federal government, i.e., Congress, the Courts and the Presidency.
He admits that while all power is subject to abuse, the real question is whether conferred powers tend to the public good, and whether their abuse can be reasonably avoided.
This paper discusses the power of the federal government to maintain a standing army in peace time, and the measures required to fund it.

In the context of Paper 41, this paper takes up the subject of the federal governent's power to make treaties, receive ambassadors and regulate foreign commerce.
It also describes the federal government's power to regulate commerce between the states - including roads and the post - as well as naturalization, and the status of official acts taken in one state in the others, what is referred to as "full faith and credit".
Madison here also addresses slavery.

Here are addressed the federal government's power to issue patents, control its capitol, punish treason, admit new states, manage public lands, to guarantee every state a republican government, and to guarantee the public debt. Madison also discusses the Constitution's rules on ratifying and amending itself.
Finally, Madison also takes up the delicate questions of how the Articles could be superceded without the unanimous consent of the states, and what status is left to states who do not ratify the new Constitution.

The restrictions [A1/S10] include prohibitions on the states' making treaties, coining or printing money, as well as prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post fact laws, laws impairing the right of contract, and the states' levying tariffs and duties on exports or imports.
Madison also discusses the more problematic clauses of the new Constitution: the "necessary and proper" clause [A1/S8] (criticized for making federal power too broad and arbitrary), the "supreme law" clause [A6] (criticized for annulling the power of the states), and the clause [A6] requiring an oath of support for the Constitution.
Madison's general response is that what is novel to the new Constitution is also necessary to it. Without the powers conferred on the federal government, the whole project would be meaningless, and any danger must be answered by the structure of the new government and the power of the electorate.

As to the danger to the states of federal power as defined under the Constitution, Madison answers that since the federal power tends so much to the safety, liberty and happiness of the people, it is "preposterous" to worry that it "...may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States...". Madison expands on the principle that political institutions are made for the people, not the other way around.
He also returns to historical examples of weak central authorities and the chaos they have produced.
Madison further argues that even under the Constitution, the power of the states is still more extensive than that of the federal government; and that, moreover, what is chiefly argued against in the Constitution is not new, but only the "invigoration" of powers granted the federal government in the Articles of Confederation.

Madison repeats that those who fear for state power have put the welfare of the states over that of the people: a fear he considers misplaced at any rate as proximity will always leave the people more attached to the state governments than to a remote federal one. Even members of Congress, he opines, will tend more to their local interests than to national ones.
Madison also argues that, in any case, states are more likely and better able to overstep their powers than the federal government, even up to the point of the federal army being no match for the state militias.
In effect, Madison concludes, a worthy federal government will have the confidence of the people; an unworthy one will be abolished.

Madison answers critics who believed the three branches of the federal government - the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Executive - were not sufficiently separated. Madison agrees that if this were true, it would indeed be the first step on the path to tyranny. He argues, however, that the critics' idea of separation is flawed, and turns to Montesquieu's interpretation of the British Constitution to show that while the functioning of the three branches may overlap, the point was that no one person or body has "whole control" over the "whole power" of more than one.
Madison also turns to the example of the state constitutions to show that many intermingle the respective powers of the branches far more than was contemplated in the Constitution.

Madison argues that a certain overlapping and intermingling of powers among the three branches of government is necessary to guarantee that no single one (and Madison's chief concern is the legislature) will overstep its bounds. Here, Madison introduces the corrollary to the principle of separation of powers; that of checks and balances.

Madison rejects Jefferson's suggestion that imbalances among the powers might best be righted by frequent constitutional conventions subject to popular approval. He writes that too frequent appeals to the people would make government unstable and would likely increase the power of the legislature.
Madison also adverts here to recurring theme throughout the Papers, that men will be swayed in their decisions by their passions, not their reason; an outcome which would jeopardize republican government.

Madison also rejects regular, periodic conventions, pointing out that if held too frequebtly, they are too close to the problems they are called to solve, and so heir to all the factionalism and infighting already swirling about the issue; or if held too infrequently, are likely only to address a problem too late to do anything about it.
Further, Madison observes, experience shows that in either case, men are, again, motivated by passion and party, not reason and the public good.

Madison asserts that the necessary checks and balances on the powers of the repsective branches of goverment must be built into the system itself. His aim is to bind the self-interest of the individual to the welfare of the republic, or, as he writes, "The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."
Madison goes on to warn of the tyranny of the majority over the minority, opining that only a diversity of interests in society can prevent such an injustice. As he writes, "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger..."
Paper No. 51 is one of the seminal documents of the Founders' political theory.

This paper outlines the requirements to elect and to be elected, and discusses at length the proper term of office.

Hamilton and Madison continue their discussion of the proper term of office for representatives, suggesting that the guarantees of the Constitution make yearly elections unnecessary to prevent usurpations by the House. Instead, they urge a minimum of a two-year term, explaining that a fit representative would need that long to learn and do his job.

Hamilton and Madison take up the question of how representatives are to be apportioned between the states, and address the thorny issue of how slaves will be counted in that apportionment.

Hamilton and Madison answer objections to the proposed initial number of 65 for the House of representatives. In rejecting tying this number to a specific ration of representatives to population, they suggest instead that it is the size of the body which is important - neither too many nor too small. They also outline the methods by which the size of the House will increase as population grows and new states are added.
To the charge that such a small body would be easily corrupted, they answer "The sincere friends of liberty, who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another."

To the charge that the House would be too small for its members to know the interests and circumstances of their constituents, Hamilton and Madison reply that it is only necessary for a representative to know those things for which he would be responsible. i.e., according to Hamilton and Madison, commerce, taxation and the militia.
They end by comparing the level of representation under the Constitution to that in Great Britian, finding the latter had preserved its liberties with far less representation than that proposed under the former.

Hamilton and Madison answer the charge that the House will be filled with elites uninterested in thier constituents. They point out that popular and frequent elections will eliminate any such possiblity. They further argue that representatives would be deterred from making bad or corrupt laws by the fact that they, themselves, would be subject to them.
They return to the point that, were the critics correct in their assessment of human nature, in their supposition that the people cannot choose honest representatives, then republican government in all cases would be impossible.
They end by returning to the example of the states where the ratio of representative to constituent covers a broad spectrum, and where no one has ever had cause to fear the corruption or usurpations of their elected bodies.

Madison sweeps away this objection by say first that augemntation and reapportionment is provided for by the Constitution, and second, that the structure and dynamics of the House and Senate will guarantee it gets done.
Madison also briefly discusses why revenue bills are to arise only in the House: money being the life-blood of government, the body most representative of the people should control it.
Madison also reminds his readers - those advocating a large House of Representives - that the more numerous a body is, the more corruptible, the more easily swayed by demogogues, and the more opaque its workings become.
He finishes by giving his objections to a proposal to require more than a majority vote for certain acts.

Hamilton answers those who object to the power of the House to to make laws respecting the elcetion of its members in Article I, section 4 [A1,s4] of the Constitution. He argues that leaving this power solely in possession of the states might endanger the union by allowing them to send no representatives should they choose, or to corrupt the process of election by tampering with the process.

Hamilton lists the reasons why it would be unlikely or impossible that Congress would or could abuse this power, esepcially with reference to the competition between agricultural and manufacturing interests, and the supposed conflict between the "wealthy and the well-born" and the rest of the people. He writes that even if Congress should attempt such an abuse by favoring one faction over another, the people would not tolerate it, and their actions would correct the abuse.

Hamilton points out that the state governments' right to regulate their own internal elections has never led to abuse, and so there is no reason to suppose a lesser power at the federal level will do so.

The paper is a synopsis of how and why the Senate is created under the Constitution, casting it cheifly as an organ of order, stability and wise moderation.

The paper unholds the Senate both as protector and repository of the national charcter. It also underlines the Senate's importance as the law-making body responsible for long-term policy, and for moderating the results of popular passions expressed in the House of Representatives.
The paper also turns to historical precedent for the utility of such a body.
It finishes by reminding those who fear the Senate's potential misuse of such a power, that not only does the structure of government preclude such misuse, but the experience with similar bodies in both the states and in Great Briatin indicate that the concern is misplaced. Indeed, experience shows that there is more to fear on that score from the more numerous and representative body, the House of Representatives.

Jay discusses why the Senate has been given responsibility to ratify treaties.

Hamilton explains the Senate's role in impeachments.

To the objection that the Senate's impeachment power mixes the legislative branch with the executive, Hamilton counters that this is both necessary and desirable as a check of the former on the latter, and that a division of the impeachment process with the House of Representatives precludes too much power from accumulating in the Senate.
Hamilton also notes that the power of the Senate respecting appointments and treaty-making is limited by having to share those tasks with the Executive, and that, ultimately, any usurpation of power by the Senate must be noted and corrected by the electorate.

Hamilton begins by describing the unreasonableness and extravagance of the objections to the creation of the Presidency; "The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene."
In this paper, he refutes, in detail, the erroneous idea that the President may appoint Senators, and ends in an access of spleen against those who had spread the notion: "Nor have I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to allow myself a severity of animadversion little congenial with the general spirit of these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed government, whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America."

Hamilton remarks the fact that this element of the Constitution had received the least criticism. The constant fear among the founders of disorder, corruption and popular gullibility is underscored by his praise , not for popular election, but the system of electors, chosen by the people, but who themselves elect the Presdient and the Vice-President.

Hamilton argues that, far from that of a British King, the character of the President most resembles a state governor: elected for a finite term, removable for treason, bribery or other "high crimes and misdemeanors", and having only a limited power to veto legislation. He continues the comparison with respect to the role of the President as commander-in-chief, his ability to pardon, to adjourn the legislature, to make treaties, and to appoint officers of the government and the courts.

Hamilton describes the nature of the Presidency, and focuses primarily on why the decision was made to invest the office in a single individual, writing that a single individual has a greater ability to act expeditiously when necessary, and must assume sole responsibility for his decisions.

Hamilton explains that while no particular term is ideal, four years seems the best compromise, being long enough for stability, continuity and to let the President confidently take the occasional unpopular, though necessary, action, while being short enough to avoid his accruing too much power.
This paper contains an interesting discussion on the idea of representation and the competency of the public.

Hamilton lists the advantages tending to the performace and the character of the President in allowing him to serve multiple terms: independence of action, the ability to plan long-term, continuity in administration and experience. He also opines that, if limited to a single term, Presidents might either care to little for the office and do nothing, or too much, and atttempt to illegally prolong it. Besides, he writes, "There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence..."

Hamilton writes that fixing the President's salary for the duration of his term would insulate him from outside influence, particularly from Congress. Further, the veto power over legislation would protect him from legislation intended to diminish his office, and protect the nation from the effects of "improper laws".

As Hamilton writes, "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." Hamilton has little more to say about it.
As for the power to pardon, Hamilton is of a mind that there are times when justice should be tempered by mercy, and that this is done better by an individual than a group, i.e. better by the President than by Congress. He also points out that, "...in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth", and that the necessity of acting immediately in such situations rightly places that power with the President.

To the objection that lodging treaty-making in both the Senate and the Presidency violates the principle of separation of powers, Hamilton answers that when such mixing results in a mutual check on those powers, there is no violation. Further, he writes, since treaty-making entails aspects of both the President's role in foreign relations and Congress' role in law-making, the participation of both in the process is both necessary and proper.
In leaving the House of Representatives out of the process, Hamilton writes, "...the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, SECRECY, and despatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous."

Much of the paper is taken up with Hamilton's opinion that a single individual is more objective and discerning in choosing persons to fill the administration of the nation than a group, which would turn toward faction and favoritism, and where candidates would be chosen on the basis of compromise and "horse-trading" rather their fitness for office.
He is not unaware, however, that Presidents also act out of self-interest and so the power of the Senate to consent to his appointments "...would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity."

To the contradictory objections that the combination of Executive nomination and Senatorial consent in the appointment of officers would empower one branch to dominate the other, Hamilton answers that the contradiction itself is proof that both propositions are false. Much of the paper is taken up in elaborating on this point.
The other constitutional duties of the President, as they were little objected to, or taken up in earlier papers, are addressed briefly in the final paragraph.

In defending life tenure for judges as a guarantor of their independence, Hamilton eloquently writes on the role of the courts and the Constitution in the political life of the nation, placing judicial review - the power of the courts to judge laws in the context of the Constitution - at the center of that role.

As a further guarantee of judicial independence, Hamilton defends the constitutional provision that judicial salaries not be diminished during their stay in office as well as the decision not to provide for the removal of judges for inability or age.

Hamilton discusses and defends the proposed class of cases that would come before the federal courts: those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the Constitution; those in which the United States are a party; those which involve the peace of the Union, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves; those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased.

Hamilton describes the jurisdiction and construction of the Supreme and inferior federal courts, explains why the Supreme Court should be an independent body, not an arm of Congress; why a system of lower federal courts, not state courts, should adjudicate federal cases; and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the nature of its appellate powers.

Hamilton limns the respective and concurrent jurisdictions of the state and federal courts, and outlines the appellate process from the former to the latter.

Hamilton takes up the objections to the lack of a provision in the Constitution for trial by jury in civil cases. He writes that mere silence on the matter in no way abolishes trial by jury in civil cases, nor certainly the same in criminal cases, which is expressly guaranteed in the Constitution.
He goes on to examine the different proposals to "correct" this omisssion, and to give his reasons why no provision should be made: that juries are not appropriate in all civil cases, and that the exceptionally varied practices between the states concerning civil jury trials makes any general provision impossible.

Hamilton begins with the criticism that the Constitution contains no bill of rights. He writes that the guarantees already in the Constitution are sufficient; that a bill of rights was traditionally a contract wresting privileges from a monarch, and so inappropriate in a republic; that by creating exceptions to the powers of the government - powers not granted anyway - they might actually give the government cause to claim them where not excepted; and that, finally, the Constitution itself is a bill of rights as it declares and specifies "...the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government." Hamilton's implication is that, guaranteed the right to govern themselves, all other rights are similarly guaranteed. This was also an argument that Hamilton would lose.
Other objections concerned debts owed to the government (there was a fear they would not be paid if it changed), the location of the capitol (too far away from most people for so powerful a government) and the expense of the new government. On this latter point, Hamilton predicted that for the most part it would cost no more than what already existed, that added expense in some areas would be offset by savings in others, and concluded that a cheap government would, in any case, be a useless one.

Hamilton recaps briefly the advantages of the Constitution; concedes it is not perfect, but reminds his readers not to let the perfect become the enemy of the good; warns that the convention that created it is unlikely ever to be duplicated; points out that it will be easier to amend it after ratification than before; and excuses himself for any intemperance in his arguments.
Among the his words are these, a charge to citizens, which though they do not close the paper, are a fitting end nonetheless: "Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence of the nation..."